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Principles on assessment of costs on standard basis – necessary or proper – 
instructions for brief to counsel - fees to expert witnesses – fees to counsel - 
relevance of recovering party’s entitlement to input credit for GST 
 
In Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 57 
McGill DCJ considered whether a range of particular costs items should be permitted on 
an assessment on the standard basis, and the amounts which should be allowed for 
such items. The judge’s views about counsel’s fees, fees paid to expert witnesses, and 
GST implications for the recovery of legal costs, will be of particular interest to 
practitioners. 
Facts 
The proceedings between the parties had been quite complex and protracted, but had 
ultimately settled on terms which included that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of 
and incidental to the proceedings on the standard basis.  
The plaintiff filed an application for costs assessment and a costs statement. The total 
amount claimed was $101,054.14. Following an assessment the registrar allowed the 
plaintiff’s costs including outlays at $41,708.99.  
The plaintiff applied for reconsideration of a number of items under r 741 of the Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR). The registrar increased the amount allowed 
to $45,283.99, but otherwise dismissed the plaintiff’s objections. 
The plaintiff applied under r 742 of the UCPR for review of that decision.  
 
Necessary or proper 
 
Rule 703(2) of the UCPR provides: 
(2) When assessing costs on the standard basis, the registrar must allow all costs 
necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the 
rights of the party whose costs are being assessed. 
The judgment contains (at [23] – [29]) a useful analysis of the meaning of "necessary or 
proper" and consideration of relevant authorities. McGill DCJ confirmed that the words 
"or proper" do add something to the scope of the test. He said that costs are 
"necessary" if the litigation could not have been carried on reasonably without them, 
and that costs are "proper" if it was reasonable for a client with a competent solicitor to 
have incurred those costs in carrying on the litigation. 
His Honour held that a registrar assessing costs on the standard basis should not adopt 
an approach which is restricted or rigid or narrow in its operation. 
 
Item 27 – Instructions for brief for counsel 
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The plaintiff had a costs assessor prepare a schedule which sought to deal with all of 
the work covered by the then applicable item 27 in schedule 2 of the UCPR as if the 
matter had proceeded in the Supreme Court. This came to $26,711. The registrar had 
rejected reliance on the schedule, and allowed only $6,711.  
 
McGill DCJ accepted that the amount derived by reference to the costs assessor’s 
schedule was not relevant to an assessment under item 27. His Honour noted, 
however, that the registrar had not explained how he arrived at the amount he allowed 
under item 27, but said it appeared he had reached that amount by simply reducing the 
total derived from the assessor’s schedule by $20,000. The judge found this approach 
to be quite arbitrary and “plainly wrong” and he concluded that the registrar’s discretion 
had miscarried. 
 
McGill DCJ then proceeded to exercise his power under r 742(5) of the UCPR to 
determine himself the appropriate allowance under item 27. He noted that he had given 
a certificate as envisaged under item 27 to permit the registrar to allow more than the  
specified amount for that item. In light of the particular complexities in the matter, he 
decided the amount to be allowed should be three and a half times the applicable 
maximum. After taking into account the various maximums which applied under item 27 
at different times over the whole course of the action, and then rounding off, this amount 
was calculated at $11,390. 
 
As McGill DCJ noted in his judgment, item 27 is no longer contained in schedule 2, as 
the District Court costs schedule has been since been brought into line with the 
Supreme Court costs schedule, which does not have an equivalent to item 27. 
Expert witness 
Some of the items claimed were for outlays paid to an expert quantity surveyor. The 
registrar had reduced the amount allowed for these outlays from the claimed amount of 
$46,218.13 to $8,030.  
McGill DCJ found that the registrar had in his reasons attempted a critique of the way in 
which the expert went about his work. His Honour said it was inappropriate for a non-
expert to do this. He accepted (at [71]) that the onus was on the party entitled to costs 
to establish that the fees paid to the expert were necessary and proper, but he said that 
prima facie that onus had been discharged by the affidavit from the expert and the 
affidavit of the solicitor. Since that evidence was uncontradicted, and there had been no 
proper evidentiary foundation laid for criticising any aspect of the expert's work, the 
items claimed for the fees to the quantity surveyor were allowed in full.   
Counsel’s fees 
The plaintiff also sought reconsideration of the registrar's decision in relation to a 
number of items for counsel's fees.  
The registrar had treated several items, including items relating to preliminary draft 
submissions and further submissions, trial preparation including conferences with client, 
and appearing at the hearing of preliminary issues, together as in effect being counsel’s 
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fee on brief. He regarded the total of $5157.50 claimed for these amounts of as clearly 
excessive.  
Contrary to the view expressed by the registrar, McGill DCJ said that the matter was not 
a relatively straightforward one. He also noted that full written submissions had been 
prepared for both sides and that this had contributed to the shortness of the matter. His 
Honour found that in matters such as this, counsel was expected to work in preparation 
for trial before the day of trial, and it was reasonable or proper for that work to be paid 
for as part of the costs assessed on the standard basis. To permit recovery only in 
respect of the work performed by counsel on the date of hearing was wrong and 
involved a serious error on the part of the registrar. 
In relation to the appropriate level of the fees paid to counsel, it was submitted for the 
plaintiff that it was not a matter for the registrar to decide what barristers should charge 
for a particular piece of work, but to assess fees by what they generally do charge, and 
that if it was reasonable to brief counsel of a particular calibre, it was reasonable to pay 
market rates for counsel of that calibre prevailing at the time.  
McGill DCJ found that this approach was not supported by the weight of authority, and 
that the registrar was entitled to decide the amount to be allowed by reference to 
considerations other than market rate. The judge’s criticism of this approach, however, 
is worthy of note. He said (at [84]): 
I must say I have difficulty with this approach; it seems to me that if it is 
necessary or proper to brief counsel of a particular standing in a matter, then it 
must logically be necessary or proper to incur whatever fee has to be paid in the 
market place in order to engage counsel of that standing, so that a fee is only 
"excessive" in the relevant sense if it is more than had to be paid in order to 
secure counsel of that standing. That seems to me to be more consistent with the 
more general authorities on party and party costs, but not with the authorities 
specifically in this area.  
McGill DCJ found, nevertheless, that the amount the registrar had allowed for counsel’s 
fees was manifestly inadequate. He considered each of the claims for counsel’s fees 
and overfall increased the amount of $7,408.50 which had been allowed by the 




Finally, the plaintiff submitted that the registrar erred in reducing the total amount 
allowed by one eleventh.  
 
The registrar had concluded that this was necessary to limit the amount recovered to an 
indemnity because the plaintiff was an entity registered for GST purposes and would 
have the benefit of one-eleventh through its entitlement to input credits. 
 
McGill SC DCJ disagreed with this approach. He accepted that it was appropriate to 
make the reduction in respect of outlays, but found the blanket reduction had also 
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applied to outlays on which GST had not been added, either because the outlay was 
incurred before 1 July 2000 when the GST legislation commenced, or because the 
outlays were not subject to GST, as was the case with court filing fees. In making the 
reduction in relation to these outlays the registrar was in error. 
 
McGill DCJ also concluded the registrar was in error insofar as the blanket reduction 
applied to professional fees.  
 
He noted the issue had been considered by Master Wood in Merringtons Pty Ltd v 
Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, No 9435 of 2005, 16.6.2006) and that 
Master Wood had concluded that no reduction could be made to professional costs 
which had been allowed according to the relevant scale because there is no discretion 
in the scale to allow less than the scale amount.  
 
McGill DCJ was satisfied that this and other authorities to which he referred established 
that the operation of the GST system and the input tax credit system was not a basis for 
reducing the scale amounts when costs are assessed on the standard basis. 
 
The judge noted that the registrar had relied on the “indemnity principle” i.e. that a party 
was not entitled to recover more by way of party and party costs than the party had 
actually had to spend. McGill DCJ found this a “hollow argument” in the context of an 
assessment on the standard basis where, as here, the amount actually charged to the 
client was well in excess of the costs assessed. 
 
He concluded that the only amounts the registrar ought to have reduced by one 
eleventh were outlays in respect of which GST was paid. He invited further submissions 




The analysis of the issue in relation to GST will have significant impact. It has been the 
practice of the registrar in Queensland in undertaking costs assessments, whether on 
the standard or the indemnity basis, to reduce the assessed costs for entities registered 
for GST by the amount of the input tax credit i.e. by one eleventh.  
 
In its very recent decision in ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd 
[2007] QCA 278 the Queensland Court of Appeal has agreed with Judge McGill’s views 
as to the correct approach, although the judgment in the Court of Appeal did not include 
any considered discussion of the issues involved. 
 
It is suggested the rationale in this case for rejecting the registrar’s approach in the 
context of professional fees assessed on the standard basis would not apply to an 
assessment on the indemnity basis. There is a strong argument that in an assessment 
of that basis a reduction should be made on account of input credit.  
 
For a detailed consideration of this and related issues see: Jackson S and Garrett P, 
“GST Implications for the Recovery of Legal Costs” (2007) Australian GST Journal 
(2007) 7 AGST 85. 
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The case also provides another illustration where the time and costs involved in the 
dispute about costs was totally disproportionate to the amount involved in the claim. 
Practitioners are encouraged to take advantage of the procedures now available under r 
605 of the UCPR and Supreme Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2007: Agreed or Fixed 
Costs (District Court Practice Direction No 3 of 2007) in relation to the fixing of costs. 
